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This paper challenges what it calls the SEMANTIC DETERMINIST HYPOTHESIS (SDH) of 
argument licensing, according to which the syntactic realisation of a verb’s arguments is 
a function of its semantic properties. Specifically, it takes issue with ‘event schema’ 
versions of the SDH applied to the English ditransitive alternation (give/send {Jesse the 
gun/the gun to Jesse}), which claim a systematic, syntactically predictive distinction 
between ‘caused possession’ and ‘caused motion’. It is first shown that semantic and 
syntactic irregularities among the alternating verbs disconfirm such a mapping. More 
crucially, however, it is argued that ‘non-prototypical’ (metaphorical and idiomatic) 
usage (The news report gave Walt an idea, Walt’s actions gave the lie to his promises, 
The discovery sent Jesse into a fury) is fatal to the SDH, since the hypothesis entails the 
existence of SEMANTIC CONSTRAINTS on argument realisation which these expressions 
violate.  
 Based on an analysis of the semantically-related verbs give, send, and put, it is 
claimed that prototypical, metaphorical and idiomatic expressions of a verb can all be 
licensed straightforwardly, but only if theory maintains separate syntactic and semantic 
representation of arguments in lexical entries, observing the ‘parallel architecture’ of 
Jackendoff (1997, 2002), and only if argument tokens are licensed by the syntactic 
representation alone. A type of structure called a LEXICAL ARGUMENT CONSTRUCTION is 
proposed, which can describe all the relevant properties of verbs and verbal idioms. 
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Many theories of argument structure have assumed some version of what is called here 
the SEMANTIC DETERMINIST HYPOTHESIS (henceforth SDH), which takes the licensing of 
a verb’s arguments to be a function of its SEMANTIC properties and which therefore 
eliminates explicit SYNTACTIC representation of those arguments in lexical entries. One 
version of the SDH uses ‘predicate decompositions’ or ‘event schemata’, which have 
been claimed to overcome the shortcomings of ‘role’-based theories.2 Pinker (1989) 
applies such an approach to the problem of ‘syntactic alternations’ in English, which 
includes the ditransitive, manifested by give and related verbs. Consider the verbs in (1) 
and the corresponding syntactic structures in (2): 
(1) (a) Walt {gave/promised/showed/sent} Jesse the gun. 
  (b) Walt {gave/promised/showed/sent} the gun to Jesse. 
(2) (a) [NP V NPi NPj] 
  (b) [NP V NPj [P NPi]] 3 
 According to Pinker, there is a single ‘caused possession’ event underlying the verbs 
in (1a), while in (1b) they instantiate ‘caused motion’, such that there is an isomorphic 
mapping between the respective semantic and syntactic structures. Pinker’s thesis 
expands on Green’s (1974) claim that there is an ‘animacy constraint’ on the indirect 
object of (2a) that does not feature in (2b). This putatively criterial semantic difference 
has formed the basis of many subsequent syntactic analyses of the ditransitive (e.g. den 
Dikken 1995, Harley 2003, Beck & Johnson 2004).4 
 Rappaport Hovav & Levin (2008) challenge an important part of this apparent 
consensus. They defend a (much) weaker variant of the hypothesis, according to which 
give, promise and show are ‘caused possession’ verbs in both syntactic variants. Of the 
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verbs in (1), only the indirect object form of send can express a ‘Path’ or ‘Goal’, 
providing evidence of a ‘caused motion’ sense (3a, b) distinct from ‘caused possession’ 
(4a, b): 
(3) (a) Walt sent/*gave/*promised/*showed the drugs {all the way to Mexico/into the   
    desert/over the border}. 
  (b) Where did Walt send/*give/*promise/*show the drugs? 
(4) (a) Walt sent/gave/promised/showed {Gus/#Mexico/#the desert/#the border} the   
    drugs.5 
  (b) Who did Walt send/give/promise/show the drugs to? 
Although their conclusion that only send and related verbs are polysemous is 
convincing, this paper maintains that Rappaport Hovav & Levin fail to support the SDH 
for the other verbs in (1). First, their ‘verb-sensitive’ proposal is nothing like sensitive 
enough.  Unlike give itself, there is no evidence that either promise or show have an 
underlying ‘caused possession’ event, i.e. that their indirect objects are ‘Possessors’ or 
‘Recipients’. It is concluded that the verbs undergoing the ditransitive alternation are 
too semantically heterogeneous to support even their substantially weakened form of the 
hypothesis. 
 More seriously, their paper glosses over what is claimed here to be a fundamental flaw 
with the SDH. Both role- and event-based approaches implicitly assume that the 
constraints the theory needs to describe are exemplified by sentences such as (5): 
(5) (a) Walt gave Jesse the flask. 
  (b) Walt gave the flask to Jesse. 
Examples of this sort intuitively represent ‘prototypical’ usage, since they best illustrate 
the ‘literal’ meaning of give: an event of volitional transfer of some concrete entity from 
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one animate participant to the other. As argued in this paper, the sense of semantic 
prototypicality arises from sentences involving argument TOKENS which instantiate the 
semantics of the verb’s argument TYPES, which can be conventionally characterised by 
the role array <Agent, Recipient, Theme>, assigned respectively to subject, indirect 
object, and direct object positions.6 But the semantic properties of argument types and 
argument tokens do not always align, something which becomes clear once we consider 
examples such as the following:  
(6) (a) Walt gave Jesse another chance. 
  (b) Walt gave subtle encouragement to the idea that he might die. 
  (c) Being a drug lord gave Walt a feeling of power. 
  (d) Fear gave intense urgency to Walt’s efforts to control Jesse.  
  (e) Skyler gave Walt a hand. 
  (f) Walt’s odd behaviour gave Skyler the creeps. 
  (g) The discovery gave the lie to Walt’s story.  
 These examples have various ‘metaphorical’ senses, because each expression contains 
at least one argument token (in bold) whose inherent semantics is at odds with that of 
the verb’s corresponding argument type. If the Theme is the ‘entity which moves’, then 
in contrast to the flask in (5), none of the NP direct objects in (6a–d) seem to qualify as 
such, since they are all abstract entities, while the subjects of (6c, d) and indirect objects 
of (6b, d) do not make good Agents or Recipients because they do not denote animates. 
The pattern of semantic non-alignment is complicated further by the idioms (6e–g), 
whose ‘open’ indirect object position seems to be assigned an idiom-contingent role: 
although they are animates, Walt in (6e) is more like a Beneficiary, and Skyler in (6f) is 
more like an Experiencer.7  
6 
 
Although Rappaport Hovav & Levin (2008) implicitly claim that their ‘caused 
possession’ hypothesis accounts for ‘all’ uses of give, it is argued here that it does not 
account for the phenomena illustrated in (6). Nor can it in principle: the SDH entails 
that syntactic arguments are derived via semantic constraints, but metaphorical 
expressions, like those illustrated, violate those constraints, and so ought not be 
licensed. Yet even the idioms of (6e–g) are strikingly unexceptional in their SYNTACTIC 
structure. If semantically ‘divergent’ usage does not violate truly GRAMMATICAL 
constraints, then semantics cannot be the source of these – clearly in direct contradiction 
to the SDH.  
 This paper argues that it therefore NECESSARY to encode syntactic and semantic 
argument types as strictly separate components of lexical entries, as in Jackendoff’s 
(1997, 2002) theory of lexical structure. Furthermore, semantic argument types do not 
determine constraints on argument tokens: constraints on argument realisation are 
purely syntactic. This hypothesis fits naturally with the analysis of metaphor in Sullivan 
(2013), central to which is the division of semantic ‘domains’ between a ‘source’ and a 
‘target’, the source of a verbal metaphor being provided by the verb and its argument 
types, and the target by at least one of the verb’s argument tokens. In this paper, the 
salient verb properties are encoded in a structure called a LEXICAL ARGUMENT 
CONSTRUCTION. This device is claimed not only to license an unbounded set of 
argument tokens (thereby licensing metaphorical uses without stipulation), but also to 
be straightforwardly extendable to the licensing of idioms as ‘lexicalised metaphors’.  
 The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 defines the SDH and sketches its 
development in generative grammar. It also shows that role- and event-based forms of 
the hypothesis equally entail constraints on the semantic properties of argument tokens 
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(‘selectional restrictions’). Section 3 analyses the serious empirical problems of the 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ variants of the SDH applied to the ditransitive, represented 
respectively by Pinker (1989) and Rappaport Hovav & Levin (2008). Section 4 presents 
the alternative hypothesis concerning lexical entries and their relationship to argument 
tokens, and analyses the syntactic and semantic properties of three related verbs: give, 
the polysemous send, and put, which has properties in common with both verbs. It is 
shown that it is the status of these properties as types interacting with tokens which 
explains the phenomena of corresponding metaphorical and idiomatic expressions. 
Section 5 introduces the Lexical Argument Construction, a Construction Grammar-type 
structure which formalises the required phonological, semantic and syntactic properties 
of a lexical verb and is claimed to provide an adequate constraint-based theoretical 
description of the data. Section 6 briefly discusses the notion of ‘predictability’ in the 
grammar. Section 7 concludes. 
2. THE ‘SEMANTIC DETERMINIST HYPOTHESIS’   
This section defines the SDH in general terms, and briefly surveys its development in 
generative grammar (Section 2.1). Section 2.2 examines the implications of such 
‘purely semantic’ specifications of argument structure for argument realisation. 
2.1 Origins and development of the SDH 
‘Semantic determinism’ is defined here as any hypothesis concerning verbal argument 
structure whereby there is a mapping from (some level of) a verb’s semantic 
representation to the syntactic form of its arguments, such that syntactic representation 
of those arguments does not feature in the verb’s lexical entry.8  
Semantic constraints on argument realisation were present in early transformational 
generative grammar (TGG) (Chomsky 1965), but they were CO-CONSTRAINTS on 
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‘lexical insertion’. A lexical predicate of category V (say, sense) both subcategorised for 
the number and syntactic category of its complements (7a), and also specified 
‘selectional features’, which placed constraints on the INHERENT SEMANTIC PROPERTIES 
OF THE HEAD of all its arguments (7b): 
(7) (a) sense, V, [+ __ NP] 
  (b) [+ANIMATE] __ [+ABSTRACT] 
Note that, in isolation, a subcategorisation frame such as (7a) is sufficient to license an 
UNBOUNDED set of complements, as long as their categorial features match those 
stipulated in the frame. However, the addition of the features (7b) constrains the set of 
argument tokens licensed for a particular position to a certain subset, in order to 
putatively block the generation of a sentence like danger senses Walt.9 
 The development of the ‘Government and Binding’ (GB) theory (Chomsky 1981) 
crucially changed the relationship between selection and subcategorisation, by 
establishing the principle that the former is a NECESSARY condition on the latter, 
following Stowell (1981), whose ‘θ-grid’ listed verbal arguments in the form of 
semantic (‘theta’) roles. Most subsequent GB work made the de facto assumption that 
theta roles are SUFFICIENT determinants of the number and category of syntactic 
arguments; finally, the UTAH (Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis) of Baker 
(1988) put in place a semantic constraint on their mapping to syntactic positions.10 
  Given well-documented problems with theta roles, which in GB were essentially 
conceived as a universal list of semantic categories, some researchers (e.g. Jackendoff 
1987, Rappaport & Levin 1988) have concluded that theta roles are not primitives of 
lexical entries, but are better understood as derived notions, being defined over lexical 
structure itself. In the TGG framework, ‘lexical decompositions’ have been formalised 
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syntactically (following Hale & Keyser 1993), with primitive predicates such as CAUSE 
and HAVE analysed as heads and projecting into structures defining argument positions, 
while in lexicalist alternatives (e.g. Levin and Rappaport 1995), such predicates 
combine into ‘event schemata’, which define semantic argument positions, which in 
turn putatively map to syntactic positions.11 But the criterial underlying claim of both 
approaches is equivalent: abstract semantic elements define ‘configurations’ from which 
the syntactic expression of surface arguments can be derived.  
2.2 Implications of the SDH for argument realisation 
Jackendoff (1987) argues that if theta roles are relational notions defined over a verb’s 
conceptual structure (an autonomous level of representation), then they must be 
determined by a verb’s individual meaning. He points out that there are many verbs 
whose theta roles cannot be captured by conventional labels (e.g. the direct objects of 
pass, jump, climb), and there is the related fact that ‘selectional restrictions’ can often 
only be stated in terms of highly specific semantic types (a liquid in the case of drink, a 
sum of money with pay).12 
 Such a conclusion sits uncomfortably with the SDH, even a version based on lexical 
decomposition. Since the semantic representation is supposed to derive the properties of 
syntactic arguments, it must embody semantic constraints in such a way that syntactic 
properties ‘fall out’ from them.13 Unlike for Jackendoff (or Chomsky 1965 for that 
matter) the constraints must generalise: they should define sets of syntactic argument 
structures (and the lexical membership of those sets) independently of the individuating 
semantic properties of their members (verbs). This necessity arises from the obvious 
fact that, although there are thousands of lexically distinct verbs, there are relatively 
very few syntactically distinct argument structures. Much of the literature on semantic 
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roles has therefore been devoted to tackling the problem of defining the nature of roles 
in such a way as to adequately predict the mapping. 
 The price that is paid for this gain in generality, however, is the loss of (potentially 
criterial) semantic distinctions between verbs which may result in an ‘event schema’ 
that fares no better than a list of theta roles. To see why, compare the paired 
configurations of theta roles in (8) with the corresponding event schemata in (9), which 
on ‘strong’ versions of the SDH map directly to the ditransitive double object and 
oblique structures respectively:   
(8) (a) <Agent, Recipient, Theme> 
  (b) <Agent, Theme, Goal> 
(9) (a) [ x CAUSE [Y HAVE Z]] 
  (b) [ x CAUSE [Z GO TO Y]] 
While the roles in (8) are simply stipulated, the roles of the variables in (9) are defined 
in relation to the semantic ‘predicates’ of which they are ‘arguments’. But the roles 
themselves are equivalent: for example, Y is the entity that is ‘caused to have Z’ in (9a), 
but the entity to which Z is ‘caused to go’ in (9b); in other words, Y is a Recipient in 
(9a), but a Goal in (9b). Hence the empirical adequacy of an event schema in predicting 
the mapping from semantics to syntax is still valid only to the extent that the roles it 
defines accurately capture the salient semantic properties of all the verbs in a 
syntactically-defined set. 
Moreover, it is not enough to say that roles are just relations defined by a predicate: 
they also invoke certain semantic argument types (‘conceptual categories’ in 
Jackendoff’s terms). For example, Recipients must be conceptually distinct from Goals, 
so there must be inherent semantic properties that distinguish them, namely that 
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Recipients must be animate (capable of ‘receiving’), whereas Goals (understood as the 
‘endpoint of a path’) need not be, and the Theme of (8a) (Z in (9a)) must be an entity 
with properties enabling it to be ‘received’. In this way, both configurations in (8) and 
(9) must determine ‘selection’ of candidate argument tokens according to what semantic 
properties they bear. Thus the SDH entails ‘selectional restrictions’ which constrain licit 
argument tokens to a subset of the syntactic types licensed by subcategorisation alone, 
just as in Chomsky (1965). 
3. EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS OF THE SDH: THE DITRANSITIVE ALTERNATION 
This section identifies two different kinds of empirical problem the SDH faces as  
applied to the analysis of the ditransitive alternation. Section 3.1 critiques what is called 
here the ‘strong’ hypothesis. This holds that a particular syntactic argument structure is 
a function of semantic class, so all verbs in one semantic class will have one argument 
structure; therefore, if a verb shows an argument structure alternation, then each 
argument structure is associated with a distinct semantic class. Although there are many 
variations on this hypothesis, it is best exemplified by the detailed lexicalist study of 
Pinker (1989).14 Section 3.2 turns to the ‘weak’ hypothesis of Rappaport Hovav & 
Levin (2008), which derives the alternation of only send-type verbs from distinct 
semantic classes, give-type verbs belonging to only one semantic class. However, it is 
shown that the SDH, even if applied to only a single verb, cannot account for ‘all uses’ 
of that verb as claimed.    
3.1 The ‘strong’ hypothesis  
Pinker’s (1989) hypothesis can be schematised as follows:  





   (b) [x CAUSE [Z GO TO Y]]  ⇒  [NP V NPj PP[to NPi]]  
As can be seen, there are two kinds of mapping rule: one maps a particular event 
schema to a particular syntactic structure, and another converts one schema into the 
other. In order to explain why the second rule is not completely productive (why some 
verbs do not entail both structures), Pinker proposes various semantic subclasses of 
ditransitive verb, membership of a certain subclass being a condition for the triggering 
of the rule.   
Pinker’s proposal amounts to a claim that all alternating ditransitives manifest a 
systematic difference of meaning between their use in the oblique and their use in the 
double object. However, Rappaport Hovav & Levin (2008) demonstrate that a ‘caused 
motion’ semantics entails a Path argument, which surfaces as a PP with a variable head, 
or as the locative pro-form where, but that this is manifested only with a subset of the 
alternating ditransitives (examples adapted from theirs): 
(11) (a) I threw/kicked the ball {halfway to Maria/behind the tree/over the fence}. 
   (b) I sent the package {halfway to Antarctica/over the border/into space}. 
(12)  (a) Where did you throw/kick the ball? 
   (b) Where did you send the package? 
By contrast, verbs in Pinker’s other subclasses (‘giving’, ‘future having’, and 
‘communication’) do not have a Path argument: the alternating verbs allow only PPs 
headed by to, and these indirect objects cannot be questioned with where:  
(13)  (a) I gave/offered/showed the ball {*halfway to Maria/*behind the tree/*over the 
fence}. 
   (b) *Where did you give/offer/show the ball?  
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Rappaport Hovav & Levin conclude that these other verbs have only a ‘caused 
possession’ meaning even in their oblique form.  
 But even this conclusion is too strong, for three main reasons. First, it is predicted that 
the indirect objects of all verbs based on a ‘caused possession’ schema will bear the role 
of Recipient, yet unlike the ‘verbs of giving’ (14a), neither show (included in Pinker’s 
‘communication’ subclass) nor any of the ‘verbs of future having’ (14b) have this 
entailment: 
(14)  (a) Skyler received the money by Walt giving/passing/handing/lending it to her.  
(b) #Skyler received the money by Walt showing/offering/promising/owing it to 
her.      
 The by-phrase is anomalous in (14b) because, as sporadically observed in the 
literature, although giving something to somebody entails that they receive it, a person 
cannot receive something simply by having it shown, offered, promised, or owed to 
them. Therefore a ‘caused possession’ sense for these verbs is unsubstantiated.15   
 Second, Pinker’s ‘future having’ and ‘communication’ subclasses are not 
syntactically valid because they are not, in fact, semantically coherent. For example, 
although causation is a basic component of the event schema, owe is a stative, not 
causative verb (Walt tried to offer/promise/#owe Skyler her freedom). Moreover, the 
‘communication’ verbs show a lack of homogeneity among the semantic argument 
types associated with the DIRECT object. Show patterns with the ‘giving’ verbs in being 
felicitous with NPs denoting concrete entities (15a), but the other verbs included in the 
subclass are not (15b): 
(15)  (a) Walt gave/lent/handed/showed Jesse {the gun/the poison/the money}. 
   (b) #Walt told/read/taught Jesse {the gun/the poison/the money}. 
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Although the indirect object referent of show is inferred to SEE something (not 
RECEIVE it), the verb itself implies a physical act involving physical entities, just like the 
‘giving’ verbs, and not a communicative one. It is therefore unsurprising that it makes a 
poor fit with the verbs in (15b). However, the argument types linked to the direct object 
of these verbs do not suffice to define a coherent semantic set either:  
(16) (a) Walt #told/read/#taught Jesse a letter. 
   (b) Walt #told/#read/taught Jesse chemistry. 
   (c) Walt told/read/taught Jesse a story. 
Even in (16c) where all three verbs are non-deviant with the same direct object token, 
the NP is interpreted differently: a story is a message in oral form with tell, but it must 
be in written form for read, and its role in relation to the indirect object referent differs 
for teach, since it is not merely perceived but mentally acquired by him. These facts 
substantiate Jackendoff’s (1987) argument that there are many verbs whose semantic 
argument types cannot be generalised by appealing to uniform semantic roles.  
 Finally, the mapping hypothesis is undermined by cases where semantic coherence 
exists, but it fails to entail syntactic coherence. Although there are near-synonyms of 
alternating ditransitives, they follow DISTINCT syntactic patterns: 
(17) (a) Walt showed {the hiding place to Skyler/Skyler the hiding place}. 
   (b) Walt revealed {the hiding place to Skyler/*Skyler the hiding place}. 
(18) (a) Walt promised/*threatened revenge to the gang that robbed him. 
   (b) Walt *promised/threatened the gang that robbed him with revenge. 
(19) (a) Walt told Skyler (of/about) the problem. 
   (b) Walt informed Skyler *(of/about) the problem. 
(20) (a) Walt gave/handed/lent {the gun to Jesse/Jesse (*with) the gun}. 
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   (b) Walt issued/presented/supplied {the gun to Jesse/Jesse *(with) the gun}. 
As we see in (20), this phenomenon is also manifested in the case of ‘verbs of giving’. 
Therefore, only those verbs that are ACTUALLY, not potentially, in the ‘giving’ subclass 
satisfy the input conditions for the rules in (10), since only they have a ‘caused 
possession’ entailment, belong to a semantically coherent set, AND undergo the ‘right’ 
alternation. Hence the ‘rules’ are vacuous. 
3.2 The ‘weak’ hypothesis 
As already noted, Rappaport Hovav & Levin (2008) (henceforth RH&L) argue, contra 
Pinker, that give instantiates only ‘caused possession’ in both syntactic variants, i.e. 
they assume the mapping rule (21): 
(21)  [ x CAUSE [Y HAVE Z]]  ⇒  [NP V NPi NPj] / [NP V NPj PP[to NPi]] 
Note that, even if this rule were not vacuous (applying only to an already-enumerated 
subset of ditransitives), it would represent a significant weakening of the SDH, since 
there is no longer any isomorphic mapping to syntactic structure from event structure. 
This notwithstanding, RH&L’s paper is remarkable for its implicit claim that ‘all uses’ 
of give are captured by the schema, since the verb’s individual meaning (its ‘root’ in 
their terms) is said to be coextensive with it (2008: 134–135). This section critically 
examines the validity of this claim.  
 According to RH&L, all of the following therefore involve the same ‘possessional’ 
meaning (examples based on theirs): 
(22) (a) Brett gave Leslie an apple. 
   (b) The court gave the parent visiting rights. 
   (c) We gave a fresh coat of paint to the front door.  
   (d) The girl gave a black eye to the kid with the German roots. 
16 
 
    (e) The ‘Artscape’ pieces gave a festive air to Park Square. 
   (f) You could give a headache to a Tylenol. [a brand of painkiller] 
   (g) Nixon’s behaviour gave Mailer an idea for a book. 
   (h) You want to give a wide berth to political discussion. 
   (i) Oscar will give any employee the boot. 
Note that these examples include two (22h, i) they acknowledge as ‘idioms’, but none 
of them are identified as problematic for their argument that all uses of give ‘involve 
caused possession’. Presumably in an attempt to claim semantic uniformity for even the 
most metaphorical expressions, they deny that the sense of physical transfer in (22a) 
betrays the basic elements of the verb’s semantics (it is said to be ‘illusory’), because 
the ‘possessum’ may be an ‘abstract entity’, in which case the inference of physical 
transfer fails, as in (22b).  
 Given that RH&L are defending the SDH (‘a verb’s own meaning plays a key role in 
its argument realization options’), what are the constraints that they assume? Although 
their paper nowhere states these explicitly (they appear to assume no constraints at all 
on either subject or direct object position), their argument clearly hinges on the 
properties of the indirect object: if give is a ‘caused possession’ verb, the variable Y in 
(21) must bear the role of Possessor (and not Location, which would imply MOVEMENT 
of Z to Y and therefore ‘caused motion’). Since a Possessor is by definition an animate, 
and the syntactic alternation no longer correlates to a difference in meaning, Green’s 
(1974) ‘animacy constraint’ on the indirect object in BOTH syntactic structures follows.  
 However, it is not the case that the indirect object is restricted to the expression of 
animates: (23a–h) are ‘echo’ responses to examples (22a–h): 
(23) (a) {*What/Who} did Brett give an apple to? 
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   (b) {*What/Who} did the court give visiting rights to? 
   (c) {What/*Who} did you give a fresh coat of paint to? 
   (d) {*What/Who} did the girl give a black eye to? 
    (e) {What/*Who} did the five ‘Artscape’ pieces give a festive air to? 
   (f) {What/*Who} could I give a headache to? 
   (g) {*What/Who} did Nixon’s behaviour give an idea for a book to? 
   (h) {What/*Who} do I want to give a wide berth to? 
   (i) {*What/Who} will Oscar give the boot to? 
The test shows clearly that the indirect object referents in (22c, e, f, h) are not animate, 
and are therefore not Possessors. Consequently, RH&L’s statement that the indirect 
object of the oblique is constrained by the fact that to ‘only takes animate complements 
and not inanimate complements that designate places’ (2008: 138) is evidently false.16 
This claim is more clearly contradicted by examples not in their data, not just in respect 
of the oblique: 
(24)  (a) Ken Livingstone gave London the Congestion Charge. 
(b) The Dutch gave the name ‘New Amsterdam’ to the city now called New 
York. 
   (c) Did the drug trade give Albuquerque a bad reputation? 
Contrary to the claim RH&L cite from the literature, the indirect object NPs in bold are 
NOT in these cases metonyms for animate referents. They are places: in (24a) London 
does not mean ‘(a particular set of) the people of or in London’; rather, it refers to the 
city as an (abstract) whole.17 
  The only independent support given for their assertion that the expressions cited above 
as (22c–e) ‘involve caused possession’ is that the relation between the indirect and 
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direct objects ‘can be described using the verb have’ (2008: 139) (their examples (20a–
c)):  
(25)  (a)  The front door has a fresh coat of paint.  
   (b) The kid with the German roots has a black eye. 
   (c)  Park Square has a festive air. 
This argument turns on the question-begging assumption that have uniformly lexicalises 
a ‘subevent’ of the schema in (21), i.e. that it always means ‘possess’. But it does not. 
Whereas John has a house means either that ‘John owns’ or ‘has use of’ a house 
(‘possesses’, in their sense), neither John has a brother nor John has a bath every day 
mean that he ‘owns’ or ‘has use of’ a sibling or an act of bathing, and the same is true of 
all the subjects in (25). Moreover, these subjects can be construed (metaphorically or 
not) as LOCATIONS rather than Possessors, and locational PPs can therefore be adjoined 
(26):  
(26)  (a)  The front door has a fresh coat of paint on it. 
   (b) The kid with the German roots has a black eye on him. 
   (c)  Park Square has a festive air around/over it. 
This is not possible, however, for the other instances of have just mentioned (including 
the possessional (27a)), even though all three can also be related to give-sentences: 
(27) (a) John has a house (#on him) ↔ Mary gave John a house. 
   (b) John has a brother (#on him) ↔ John’s parents gave him a brother. 
   (c) John has a bath (#around/over him) every day ↔ John’s mother gives him a 
bath every day. 
These uses of have are therefore semantically non-uniform, and do not support the claim 
that a ‘caused possession’ event underlies (22c–e).18 
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It is reasonable to conclude, then, that the expressions in (22b–i) only have various 
METAPHORICAL senses of ‘caused possession’, contra RH&L. But this is not an option 
for their ‘single meaning’ version of the SDH, which entails that the verb imposes 
UNIFORM semantic constraints on its argument tokens (see Section 2.2 above). RH&L 
appear to try to pre-empt this difficulty by stating at the outset of their paper that the 
notion ‘possession’ should be ‘construed broadly’ – broadly enough, apparently, to 
include the idioms (expressions they define as having ‘a non-literal meaning’) in (22h, 
i), but not give birth/rise/way to NP, regarding which they surprisingly comment that 
the verb ‘seems to have been bleached of its possessional meaning’ (2008: 155).19 
However, if the concept ‘possessor’ is ITSELF ‘metaphorical’, then it predicts nothing, 
because any NP at all could qualify as a ‘possessor’ and be licensed as an indirect 
object, and since according to the SDH, semantics is the SOLE source of grammatical 
constraints, it would follow that there are no constraints on grammatical structure at 
all.20  
 The reductio ad absurdum of this position is that there is no way of distinguishing 
between ‘caused possession’ and ‘caused motion’. Consider the pairs in (28) and (29): 
(28) (a) Skyler gave the door a coat of paint. 
 (b) Skyler put a coat of a paint on the door. 
(29) (a) Skyler gave Walt the blame. 
   (b) Skyler put the blame on Walt. 
According to the SDH, the door and Walt are Possessors or Recipients when they 
appear with give but Locations when they are arguments of put. Yet the paired 
expressions are clearly synonymous, and have the same entailments (‘the door is 
covered with paint’; ‘Walt is made responsible’), so there is no way to distinguish one 
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event schema from the other, and no logical riposte to the counterhypothesis that give 
and all the other ditransitives ‘metaphorically’ instantiate the ‘caused motion’ schema.21 
Any meaningful comparison of hypotheses is therefore impossible. 
3.3 Conclusions 
This section has shown that the SDH cannot be maintained as an adequate account of 
the ditransitive alternation. The ‘strong’ hypothesis, whereby distinct event schemata, 
‘caused possession’ and ‘caused motion’, map to corresponding syntactic structures, is 
disconfirmed by the absence of systematic polysemy among the alternating verbs, the 
absence of a general ‘caused possession’ semantics, and the failure of a ‘caused 
possession’ semantics to entail the alternation. Even the ‘weak’ hypothesis, which holds 
that a single ‘caused possession’ event maps to ‘all uses’ of one verb – give – fails in the 
face of metaphorical and idiomatic expressions which violate the constraints that the 
SDH entails. 
4.  THE INTERACTION OF VERBAL SEMANTICS AND SYNTACTIC ARGUMENT STRUCTURE:   
  FROM ‘PROTOTYPICAL’ USE TO IDIOM 
This section sets out the alternative hypothesis of lexical entries, concerning the 
relationship between a verb’s lexical meaning, its semantic arguments, and its syntactic 
arguments. The crucial principle is that syntactic arguments are represented discretely 
from semantic arguments, which are types that do not constrain the realisation of 
argument tokens, although it will be shown that the semantics of types versus tokens is 
critical to (metaphorical) interpretation. The hypothesis stated in Section 4.1 is then 
applied to three semantically and syntactically related verbs: ‘caused possession’ give, 
polysemous send, and the non-alternating ‘location’ verb put. It is shown that a correct 
characterisation of these verbs’ semantic and syntactic argument types accounts for the 
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‘argument realisation’ phenomena of these verbs in both prototypical and non-
prototypical (metaphorical and idiomatic) use. Section 4.2 addresses more directly the 
principles of verbal metaphor generation, based on Sullivan (2013), and shows how 
these support the hypothesis. In the light of these principles, Section 4.3 addresses the 
question of what a verbal ‘idiom’ is.  
4.1 A non-determinist hypothesis of lexical entries 
The alternative hypothesis concerning the properties of lexical entries is stated 
informally as follows: 
(30) (a) The lexical entry of a verb contains all stipulated phonological forms  
(minimally, that of the verb itself), the meaning of the verb, all its semantic 
arguments, and all its syntactic arguments (morphosyntactic categories). 
(b) Semantic arguments are types determined by the meaning of the verb and are 
linked to, but do not determine the form of, syntactic arguments. 
(c) Syntactic arguments are morphosyntactic types and are the only part of the 
lexical entry licensing argument tokens.  
Nothing in (30) precludes a lexical entry from having a single set of semantic arguments 
but more than one set of syntactic arguments. The hypothesis is neutral as to whether 
the verb’s meaning itself is ‘structured’ in the sense of e.g. Jackendoff (1990), but 
semantic arguments are the only part of meaning ‘visible’ to argument structure.   
 Some evidence for semantic arguments as types, existing independently of syntactic 
realisation, is supplied by the following: 
(31) (a) It was surprising that they died so suddenly. 
   (b) (For them) to shine so much was surprising. 
(32) (a) It was surprising that they gave them that. 
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   (b) (For them) to owe that to them was surprising. 
Devoid of context, the pronominal subject arguments of die and shine in (31) are likely 
to be construed as animate and inanimate respectively, since it is animates that die and 
inanimates that shine. Similarly, in (32), the subject and indirect object arguments of 
give and owe have their ‘default’ animate interpretation. However, as we have seen, 
argument tokens need not conform to these properties: 
(33) (a) It was surprising that the computers died so suddenly. 
   (b) For the girls to shine so much at school was surprising. 
(34) (a) It was surprising that steel tubes gave the designs such a ‘retro’ look. 
   (b) For the experiments to owe their success to atmospheric conditions was  
     surprising. 
Nonetheless, as was shown in the echo-question test (23), the non-prototypical tokens 
RETAIN their inherent semantic properties: 
(35) (a) It was surprising that what died so suddenly? 
   (b) For who to shine so much at school was surprising? 
(36) (a) It was surprising that what gave what a ‘retro’ look? 
   (b) For what to owe their success to what was surprising? 
In other words, the semantic properties of the argument types and the argument tokens 
are DISJOINT, a phenomenon which will be returned to below. 
In this light, we now look at give in more detail. The Oxford English Dictionary gives 
the ‘general sense’ of the verb in modern English as To make another the recipient of 
(something that is in the possession, or at the disposal, of the subject).22 The definition 
intuitively characterises a physical act of transference involving three participants, 
which can again intuitively be distinguished: (i) an agentive, animate (prototypically 
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human) agent; (ii) an animate recipient; (iii) an inanimate physical entity capable of 
being passed from (i) to (ii).23 These semantic properties characterise and individuate 
the verb’s semantic arguments.  
 Note that it is not sufficient for the direct object argument to be inanimate; it must also 
possess certain concrete properties (e.g. solidity and mobility) to be physically 
transferable. When an argument token lacks one or more of these properties, there is a 
concomitant effect on the construal of the act of transfer itself. Compare the following:  
(37) (a) Gus gave Walt a new lab. 
   (b) Gus gave Walt a punch.  
   (c) Gus gave Walt an important task. 
   (d) Gus gave Walt an hour to get ready. 
   (e) Gus gave Walt three reasons to betray Jesse. 
While a laboratory is inanimate, it has properties (size, mass, immobility) which make 
the inference of physical transfer fail; only the inference of transfer of ownership or use 
remains. The NPs a punch and an important task have (possible) physical 
manifestations, but lack concrete properties; the nouns hour and reason denote entirely 
abstract entities. This mismatch between the properties of the semantic argument and 
those of the tokens results in the ‘transfer’ meaning denoted by the verb being only 
metaphorically interpretable; in all apart from (37a), even the notion of ‘possession’ 
becomes abstract.  
As already borne out by the data in Section 3.2, the indirect object can be realised by 
non-animate tokens (see also (38b–d) below), but the same is true of the subject, where 
inanimate tokens ‘conflict’ with the agentive, animate argument type associated with 
this position:  
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(38) (a) The helmet gave Athelstan an idea.24  
   (b) It’s the tomatoes that give this dish its sharp flavour. 
 (c) Honesty gives moral strength to a person’s character. 
 (d) The fact that we were strangers gave our information a strange         
     importance. 
Again, the subject NPs retain their inherently inanimate reference (as a what? test will 
confirm) and therefore are not inherently ‘agentive’. But their syntactic position, where 
an animate argument type is interpreted, triggers an interpretation whereby they cause 
‘transfer’ of some entity to a metaphorical recipient.  
 What of the relation between the verb’s semantic arguments and its syntactic 
argument structure? As already established, give has two syntactic structures, but only 
one meaning, and therefore only one set of semantic arguments, so the same arguments 
must be mapped to both structures. Furthermore, since the verb has no sense of ‘caused 
motion’, the preposition to of the oblique cannot denote a Path, and as the oblique is 
synonymous with the double object, it follows that to is meaningless, and must be 
simply a stipulated form in the lexical entry. 
The role of syntactic arguments in determining constraints, plus that of semantic 
arguments in the triggering of metaphor, are supported by a brief initial consideration of 
give-idioms, of which a small sample is provided in (39): 
(39)  (a) Skyler gave Walt the elbow. 
   (b) Jesse gave the formula a go. 
   (c) Hank gives his all to police work. 
   (d) Walt finally gave the green light to Skyler’s plan. 
   (e) Jesse wanted to give meth-making a rest. 
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   (f) Skyler gave birth to a girl. 
Four things are striking: first, that give-idioms, in principle at least, occur in both 
syntactic variants. Second, as noted by Hudson (1992: 262) and Bruening (2010: 536), 
the ‘fixed’ part of give-idioms (in boldface) is always the direct object, never the 
indirect object alone. Third, as can be seen in (39b-e), the ‘open’ indirect object position 
can be occupied by an inanimate. Fourth, the fixed direct object, though inanimate in its 
literal reference, does not otherwise conform to the physical properties of the argument 
type, so we do not find idioms like give NP a book. Idioms therefore share properties 
with metaphorical uses in that (i) they obey the verb’s syntactic constraints; (ii) they do 
not observe putative semantic constraints; (iii) at least one argument token (the direct 
object in the case of idioms) must be semantically disjoint with the verb’s 
corresponding argument types.25 
We turn now to send. Given the premise that this verb is polysemous, it has two sets 
of semantic argument types. One set, entailed from the ‘caused possession’ sense, will 
be assumed to be identical to that of give above, and these arguments will be mapped to 
the same alternation, repeated below: 
(40)  (a) [NP V NPi NPj] 
   (b) [NP V NPj [P NPi]] 
It is then predicted that send in this sense should behave in principle just like give in 
allowing subjects and indirect objects in either variant to be realised by inanimates as 
well as animates, and direct objects to be non-concrete: 
(41) (a) Walt’s act of violence sent {his enemies/Albuquerque/the world} a chilling  
  message. 
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(b) Walt’s act of violence sent a chilling message to/*towards{his 
enemies/Albuquerque/the world}. 
As (41b) shows, the hypothesis that the argument type linked to the indirect object is a 
Recipient is supported by the fact that only to, and not a true Path preposition, is 
licensed. It is also notable that, as with give, there are no idioms with a fixed indirect 
object and open direct object. On the other hand, the ability of an inanimate indirect 
object to have a ‘metaphorical recipient’ interpretation seems considerably more limited 
than give: 
(42) (a) Walt gave/#sent the house a complete makeover. 
   (b) Walt gave/#sent the idea he might die subtle encouragement. 
(c) Fear gave/#sent Walt’s efforts to control Jesse intense urgency. 
However, this restriction can be attributed to the fact that send, even in the above sense, 
has a more specific lexical meaning than give (something like ‘transfer by causing to 
go’) and is therefore less readily available to metaphorical usage per se.26 
In its ‘caused motion’ sense, send has a Path argument instead of a Recipient. This 
argument maps to a PP, which consists of a preposition specifying the Path, and an NP 
complement specifying its endpoint. Unlike give, there is no lexical restriction on the 
preposition:  
(43)  Gus sent the drugs {to the warehouse/over the border/towards Mexico}. 
In fact, the head of the PP is clearly semantic, so in this context to is ‘allative’, i.e. it has 
its meaning of ‘up to an endpoint’, and is not a meaningless grammatical marker. The 
preposition is therefore lexical, and itself selects its NP complement (its ‘subject’ being 
the direct object of the verb). Therefore, the internal properties of the PP are not 
relevant to the syntactic argument structure of the verb, which is as follows:  
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(44)  [NP V NP PP] 27 
Further evidence that the Path argument is mapped to the whole PP (and not to the NP 
inside it) is provided by a comparison between the ‘caused possession’ sense of (45a) 
and the ‘caused motion’ one of (46a): 
(45) (a) Gus sent {the Mexicans the drugs/the drugs to the Mexicans}. 
   (b) Who did Gus send the drugs to? 
(46) (a) Gus sent the drugs over to the Mexicans. 
   (b) Where did Gus send the drugs? 
In (45a), the Mexicans realises a Recipient argument and is animate, as shown by the 
use of who? in (45b). But in (46), where to is a (modifiable) Path preposition, the PP is 
questioned with where, and so is a Path argument and interpreted as one, even though 
the answer is ‘to the Mexicans’ (meaning that the Mexicans is a metaphorical 
‘endpoint’). 
The polysemy view of send solves an apparent ‘idiom anomaly’ illustrated by the 
following expressions, originally cited in Larson (1988: 340) as evidence that (some) 
‘goal’ indirect objects of ditransitives can be idiomatic:  
(47) (a) Lasorda sent his starting pitcher to the showers. 
   (b) Mary took Felix to the cleaners. 
   (c) Felix threw Oscar to the wolves. 
However, as Larson (2017: 423) concludes, these idioms are in fact not true 
ditransitives, but based on ‘caused motion’ verbs. If these verbs have Path arguments 
interpreted on their PP, then the bolded NPs are metaphorical endpoints like the 




The third verb to be considered is put, which superficially seems similar to ‘caused 
motion’ send, subcategorising for a PP, but permitting a ‘free’ choice of preposition: 
(48) Walt put the gun inside/on/under/over/beside the bed. 
Although Jackendoff (1987: 391) remarks that the verb has a ‘curious selectional 
restriction’, disallowing a preposition of source (from), direction (to, towards) or route 
(through), this is not an absolute restriction, as the following metaphorical/idiomatic 
expressions show:  
(49)  (a) put NP from one’s mind, put NP out of pocket 
(b) put NP to bed, put NP to the test, put money towards NP 
(c) put NP through a window, put NP through his/her/its/their paces, put NP    
   through an ordeal 
Thus subcategorisation for a lexically unspecified PP must be correct; the apparent 
‘selectional restriction’ says something about the argument type mapped to this PP.  
 Comparison with send and put in a prototypical context shows that their Path 
argument is not of the same type:  
(50)  (a) send/#put the drugs {towards the mountains/(halfway) to Mexico} 
   (b) put/#send the drugs {into the drawer/at the side of the desk} 
   (c) put a student {in jail, in a different seminar group} 
   (d) send a student {to jail, to a different seminar group} 
This distribution of PPs suggests that this argument of put describes a trajectory, but 
also a spatial relationship between the complement of the preposition and the direct 
object of the verb (concepts that to and towards cannot denote), so the verb does not 
really lexicalise ‘caused motion’, but something more like ‘caused location’. In contrast, 
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as we have seen, the Path of send includes an endpoint (concepts denoted by to and 
towards).  
In fact, the meaning of put is arguably at least as close to give as to send. As expected, 
metaphorical and idiomatic usage reveals the lack of semantic constraints on argument 
realisation, but put manifests both metaphorical Themes (like give), and metaphorical 
Paths (like send) (non-prototypical forms in bold):  
(51) put something into a category, put {a curse on, the wind up, the fear of God in} 
somebody, put somebody/something at risk, put somebody {at ease, in the 
picture, in a mood, under observation} 
Nonetheless all these examples meticulously respect the syntactic argument structure  
represented in (44). 
 If there are no semantic constraints on argument realisation, there is a further 
prediction. Although semantically ‘mismatching’ argument tokens might lead to 
coherent metaphorical interpretations, they need not. Thus expressions with ‘fictional’ 
senses are licensed by the grammar (52a), as well as surreal (52b) and nonsensical ones 
(52c): 
(52) (a) The acacia tree gave the honey badger a tail-brush. 
   (b) Dali’s lips put the set of all prime numbers inside the Horsehead Nebula. 
   (c) Sincerity may send forgetfulness towards bravery.29 
If argument tokens are subject only to syntactic constraints, then expressions such as 
those above are entirely non-deviant as far as the grammar is concerned. 
In conclusion, the hypothesis of (30) correctly predicts that the only grammatical 
constraint on argument tokens of these verbs is provided by their syntactic argument 
structure, with a verb’s semantic argument types only determining their interpretation. 
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Hence metaphorical and idiomatic expressions are licensed in principle. However, this 
does not in itself account for how metaphorical expressions ‘work’, or how they are 
related to ‘idiomatic’ expressions. The next two sections turn to these questions. 
4.2 The relation between verbal semantics and metaphor  
Lakoff (1987) observes that metaphor is universal and pervasive in natural languages, 
but his contention that metaphor moulds the grammatical system itself is unpersuasive. 
Sullivan’s (2013) study of metaphoric language emphasises that the reverse is true:  
grammatical structures have an essential role in CONSTRAINING metaphorical 
interpretations. Metaphors are cognitive phenomena that involve a process of mapping a 
‘source’ concept (usually of a concrete kind) to a ‘target’ concept (usually abstract). 
Crucial to the understanding of verbal metaphors is the fact that, in Sullivan’s terms, 
verbs are conceptually ‘dependent’ elements (in the sense of usually requiring other 
‘autonomous’ elements – arguments, in fact – for their interpretation): verbs therefore 
make good ‘source domains’ for metaphors involving ‘target domain’ arguments. For 
this to be possible, metaphors must belong to the conceptual system, which is 
independent of the grammatical system (one of the key principles of ‘representational 
modularity’ argued for in Jackendoff 1997). In this light, we can now understand that 
the empirical problems which metaphors pose for the SDH derive directly from the 
LACK of any syntactic argument structure representation, which makes it impossible for 
‘source’ and ‘target’ domains to be distinguished. 
The principle that source and target domains must be conceptually distinct allows us 
to be more precise about the role of semantic arguments in terms of the present 
hypothesis. It is the meaning of a verb and its semantic argument TYPES that provide the 
source of a metaphorical interpretation, and argument TOKENS that provide the target.30 
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A metaphorical interpretation can then be triggered if at least one argument token is 
semantically disjoint with the corresponding semantic argument type. Compare again: 
(53) (a) Walt gave Jesse a gun. 
   (b) Walt gave Jesse a punch. 
The lexical meaning of give and its semantic argument types provide the source: the 
basic sense of transfer by an animate Agent of a concrete Theme to an animate 
Recipient. In (53a) the semantic properties of every token are ‘subsumed’ by the 
properties of the corresponding type, so the ‘target’ NPs are understood as instantiations 
of the source types – hence the ‘prototypical’ sense. In (53b), the metaphorical 
interpretation – ‘Walt punched Jesse’ – is triggered by the target a punch, whose 
semantic properties are now disjoint with the properties of the source type linked to the 
direct object position.31 Combined with the (source) sense of ‘transfer’ from the verb 
and the source types of the other two arguments, this generates the metaphor (that 
punching somebody is like transferring an object to them).  
4.3 The relation between verbal metaphor and idioms 
The notion of an ‘idiom’, as addressed in the literature, encompasses a rather 
miscellaneous collection of ‘multi-word’ expressions, ranging from highly irregular 
(including grammatically fossilised) forms at one extreme (see van Gestel 1995 for 
Dutch data) to ‘conventionalised’ phrases such as center divider (Nunberg et al. 1994) 
at the other. Another property that has been held to be criterial, particularly for verbal 
idioms, is semantic opacity or ‘non-compositionality’, as evidenced by kick the bucket 
and shoot the breeze, although it has been observed that it does not, in fact, appear to be 
very typical of expressions which are intuitively idiomatic.32 Having established that 
metaphorical usage fully respects the syntactic argument structure of the verb, and that 
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the only difference between prototypical and metaphorical usage lies in the properties of 
the argument tokens themselves, it is possible that there is no basis for positing a 
separate category of ‘idioms’ for any of the expressions studied here. Indeed, Larson 
(2017) argues that there are NO true ditransitive idioms at all. Consider the following 
three sets of expressions: 
(54) (a) give NP a cold, a headache, the mumps… 
   (b) give NP a kiss, a push, a smile, a wave… 
   (c) give NP the creeps, flak, a hand, the boot, one’s all… 
Larson first draws attention to expressions of type (54a), whose direct objects denote 
communicable illnesses: these seem ‘completely productive’, and the direct objects all 
have their usual dictionary meanings. The same can be said for the ‘denominal’ direct 
objects in (54b): as the meaning of the direct object is transparent, the meaning of its 
combination with the verb can be derived. Larson goes on to argue that expressions of 
the type in (54c) (where the regularity of the direct objects is less convincing) are no 
different: for example, if the creeps means ‘a feeling of apprehension or horror’, then 
the expression The Count gave me the creeps can be generated without special 
stipulation.   
 Larson’s analysis is plausible in principle, but there are a number of problems with 
it. If the expressions of the (54c) type are indeed compositional, it is necessary that their 
direct objects combine in that form, since they are generally invariant: 
(55) (a) give NP the creeps/*a creep/*creeps       ‘make NP feel uneasy’ 
   (b) give NP a hand/*the hand/*hands        ‘help NP’ 
     (c) give NP the boot/*the boots/*a boot/*boots   ‘rudely dismiss NP’ 
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Therefore there must be in the lexicon an idiomatic NP ‘the creeps’ meaning ‘feeling of 
unease’, an NP a hand meaning ‘help’, an NP ‘the boot’ meaning ‘rude dismissal’, and 
so on, in order for the expressions to be computed as Larson claims. Furthermore, these 
NPs and their relationship to the verb are no different from those in generally 
uncontested idioms such as keep tabs on (‘monitor closely’), spill the beans (‘reveal a 
secret’) or pull strings (‘exert influence’), in two respects. First, their direct objects have 
the specially idiomatic property that they supply metaphorical SOURCES, not targets, 
together with the verb (as noted by Sullivan 2013: 96). For example, both spill and the 
beans evoke ‘reveal’ and ‘a secret’. Equally, give evokes ‘transfer’ and a hand evokes 
‘help’. Second, Larson’s contention that the apparent give-idioms are merely 
‘collocations’ (a collocation being a ‘conventionalized co-occurrence’) is problematic, 
because for him, ‘conventionalized’ appears to mean only that words are ‘used together 
frequently’ (Larson 2017: 399), like rancid butter and dead serious. But while the 
collocation of rancid and butter can be PREDICTED from the meaning of rancid, the 
same cannot be said of give and the direct objects in (54a–c).  The meanings of lend NP 
a cold, put a kiss on NP, and throw NP the boot are compositional/computable, but they 
are not collocations because they are not conventionally associated with the meanings 
that the expressions in (54) are. Rather, the direct objects of (54) collocate with give in 
the sense of being ‘conventionally associated in the lexicon’33    
  A further problem is that Larson does not succeed in showing that ALL ditransitive 
idioms are syntactically productive. Since give syntactically alternates in both 
prototypical and metaphorical use, we would expect all candidate idioms to do the 
same. But this is by no means clearly the case: 
(56) (a) ?Walt gave {a cold/the mumps/a smile/a wink} to his baby daughter. 
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   (b) ??Walt gave {a kiss/a tickle/a wash} to his baby daughter. 
   (c) ??Jesse gave {a go to the new formula/a rest to meth-making}. 
   (d) ??The discovery gave Walt’s story the lie.  
   (e) *Skyler gave the child birth.  
  (f) *Walt gave his worries voice. 
  (g) *Walt gave fortune hostages. 34 
For these reasons, we must conclude that ditransitive idioms are genuine, and fit into 
the hypothesis (30) as ‘partly lexicalised’ metaphors, in the sense that (i) the idiomatic 
constituent is represented phonologically; (ii) the metaphorical meaning, like that of 
kick the bucket, is therefore stored with the whole expression. In Section 5 it will be 
shown how a theoretical description can account for both ‘compositionality’ (of 
metaphorical and prototypical uses) and (partial) ‘non-compositionality’ (of idioms).35  
4.4 Conclusions 
This section has confirmed that the three verbs analysed do not determine semantic 
constraints on argument realisation. Constraints on argument tokens are syntactic, in 
respect of which the inherent semantic properties of argument tokens are irrelevant. One 
apparent constraint – the ‘selection’ of a lexical preposition with ‘caused motion’ send 
and put – is in fact a side-effect of the semantic argument type linked to the PP in the 
syntactic representation. Metaphorical interpretations occur when the semantics of one 
or more argument tokens (the ‘target’) are disjoint with the corresponding semantic 
argument types determined by the verb (both part of the ‘source’). Consideration of 
idioms as partly lexicalised metaphors confirms this view: both their syntactic structure 
and metaphorical nature have their roots in the syntactic and semantic properties of the 
head verb.  
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5.  A UNIFORM REPRESENTATION FOR LEXICAL ENTRIES 
This section presents a theoretical description of the results above. After setting out 
some general theoretical assumptions in Section 5.1, the ‘Lexical Argument 
Construction’ is introduced (Section 5.2), an argument-licensing structure which 
represents the required properties of a verb including grammatical constraints. Lexical 
Argument Constructions are then illustrated for the three verbs analysed in Section 4, as 
well as for a give-idiom, to show how the description can incorporate the representation 
of idioms using the same principles.  
5.1 Theoretical background and assumptions 
Although no particular theory of syntax will be adopted here, a constraint-based, 
Construction Grammar (CxG)-type framework is assumed. CxG takes the lexicon of the 
grammar to consist of CONSTRUCTIONS: in the most general terms, constructions are 
associations of ‘form’ with ‘function’. The main theoretical value of constructions for 
the present study is that they are NON-DERIVED and NON-UNIFORM: they may be as small 
as morphemes, or be syntactic units (possibly semi- or fully-lexicalised). Hence CxG is 
readily amenable to the representation of idioms and other idiosyncratic expressions 
(see e.g. Kay & Fillmore 1999).36 But if the argument properties (syntactic and 
semantic) of a lexical head are taken to be non-derived, then a lexical head and its 
dependants are a candidate construction also. 
This notion of ‘construction’ is combined with the compatible principles of lexical 
structure proposed in Jackendoff (1997, 2002). Jackendoff’s model for lexical items 
conforms to the properties of his ‘parallel architecture’: a tripartite linguistic system 
composed of strictly autonomous generative subsystems (phonology, semantics, syntax) 
linked by ‘interface rules’. On his view, a lexical item is a form of INTERFACE 
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CONSTRAINT, since in the typical case it registers information from all three systems. As 
Jackendoff (2002: Section 6.5) argues, the properties of idioms require these too to be 
stored (as phrasal ‘lexical items’), but in his model these properties can easily be 
handled by the interface rules. In the present proposal, this form of idiom representation 
is generalised to an argument-taking lexical head itself, so that the head appears in a 
syntactic configuration with its argument types. The major advantage is that the 
structural principles of a verbal idiom are then identical to those of its (non-idiomatic) 
head verb, the major difference being in what is represented. 
5.2 The Lexical Argument Construction 
A LEXICAL ARGUMENT CONSTRUCTION (henceforth LAC) is a subtype of construction 
that represents the phonological, semantic, and syntactic properties of a lexeme (e.g. a 
lexical verb). It takes the form of an attribute-value matrix, where the attributes are 
phonology (PHON), semantics (SEM), and syntax (SYN), and the values are the specified 
corresponding properties of the LAC. The PHON value is that of the verb and any other 
stipulated lexemes; the SEM value is the meaning of the LAC (usually just the verb) plus 
a representation of the semantic arguments (SEM-ARGS) that it entails; the SYN value 
specifies the category of the head (X) plus those of its syntactic arguments (SYN-ARGS)   
in phrasal (XP) form (plus any other relevant morphological properties). A SYN-ARG is 
therefore a purely formal type, e.g. ‘NP’.   
 Following Jackendoff (2002), the three components of an LAC are linked in various 
ways by ‘correspondence rules’ in the form of co-indexing. The strict separation of the 
components means that (i) ‘lexicalisation’ of any part of an LAC means representation 
as a PHON value; (ii) the properties of the SYN-ARGS and SEM-ARGS are independent of 
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each other and therefore non-redundantly stateable; (ii) there need be no fully 
isomorphic mapping between the elements of the three components. 
To make things concrete, the LAC for the lexeme give is illustrated below:37 








PHON < givei , toj >
SEM 'give' < GIVE-AGTx, GIVE-RCTy, GIVE-THMz >









It will be seen that the PHON attribute specifies the phonological content of the LAC, 
which here consists of the lexical verb and the preposition to (which must be stipulated). 
These items are coindexed with heads in the SYN attribute, thereby associating each 
PHON form with its respective lexical category.  
The SEM part of the LAC represents the meaning of give (‘give’) and also identifies 
its SEM arguments, distinguished by the symbols shown.38 Each is co-indexed with NPs 
represented in the SYN attribute. There is no coindexing between to or P and any part of 
SEM, ensuring that the preposition is semantically ‘void’. However, it will be noticed 
that whereas the SEM component contains only one representation, the SYN part contains 
two, and the SEM-ARGS are linked differently. This describes the fact that although there 
is only one meaning of give, its SEM arguments can be realised in two syntactic variants 
(with no effect on meaning).  
 The importance of the co-indexing of the SEM-ARGS and SYN-ARGS is that it indirectly 
links semantic sources with semantic targets (argument tokens) via the syntactic 
licensing of the latter.39 The SYN value represents a constraint on argument realisation: 
only tokens which are NPs will be licensed in each position. However, the coindexing 
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ensures that a licensed NP will be interpreted by the corresponding SEM-ARG. For 
example, any NP token licensed in indirect object position (NPy) will be linked to the 
SEM-ARG <GIVE-RCT> and interpreted as an ‘instance’ of this type, if, as explained in 
Section 4.2, the semantics of the token is subsumed by the semantics of the type. If one 
or more tokens is semantically disjoint with the corresponding type(s), then a 
metaphorical interpretation may be triggered. Other than preventing the licensing of any 
item which is not of the stipulated category, the SYN representation exercises NO 
FURTHER CONSTRAINTS on argument realisation.  The corollary is that an unbounded set 
of phonologically filled NPs may unify with the phonologically empty (i.e. unlinked)  
argument positions in the LAC.  
 On this basis, we now look at how the LAC represents verbal idioms. The LAC for 
give a hand (to) is illustrated below: 









PHON < givei , a handj , tok >
SEM 'help' < HELP-AGTx, HELP-BENy >









Comparing (58) with (57), we see that the PHON string a hand is stipulated, which is 
now coindexed with the NPj (direct object) positions in SYN. This has the effect of 
‘blocking’ the licensing of any other NP in that position. The SEM-ARG linked with that 
position in the LAC of give is now absent, since the meaning of the verb (glossed as 
‘help’) can now be thought of as associated with the whole string give a hand (to). Only 
two SEM-ARGS remain, which are coindexed with the subject and indirect object NPs 
unlinked to phonological material. The NPs that they are linked to will license NP 
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tokens in the same way as with give above, but of course they will now be interpreted 
differently, since the SEM-ARGS are now of different types, in line with the special 
meaning of the idiom.40 This representation assumes, of course, that this idiom is truly 
alternating. If the string give a hand to cannot be licensed, then the PHON representation 
of the preposition and the oblique SYN representation are simply omitted. 
We now illustrate the LACs for send.  








PHON < sendi , toj >
SEM 'send' < SEND-AGTx, SEND-RCTy, SEND-THMz >

















PHON < sendi > 
SEM 'send' < SEND-AGTx, SEND-THMy , SEND-PATHz >









As two senses are postulated for this verb, accordingly two LACs are represented: (59) 
illustrates the ‘caused possession’ sense. In its formal properties it is identical to give. 
However, (60) has a somewhat different representation: (i) there is only one SYN 
structure; (ii) no internal structure is represented for the PP, and there is no PHON 
material linked to it; (iii) the PP is coindexed with a different SEM-ARG <SEND-PATH>.  
This entails, as desired, that any kind of PP token will be licensed. But if its meaning is 
disjoint with the SEM-ARG <SEND-PATH> to which it is linked, it will be interpreted as 
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either metaphorical or deviant: as with give, a prototypical interpretation will only result 
if the semantics of all argument tokens are subsumed by the verb’s SEM-ARGS. 
 Finally, we show the LAC for put: 








PHON < puti > 
SEM 'put' < PUT-AGTx, PUT-THMy, PUT-LOCz >









As the reader can verify, this LAC is syntactically identical to that of (60), but it is the 
properties of the SEM representation that account for the differences identified in Section 
4.1: for example, the linking of the PP to the SEM-ARG <PUT-LOC> entails a different 
type of interpretation on a PP token. Idioms of both verbs would follow the same 
principles as illustrated above for give a hand to, representing a different meaning, 
different and fewer SEM-ARGS, and more PHON material (e.g. for put NP at risk, the PP 
would be coindexed with at risk). 
6. DISCUSSION: ARGUMENT STRUCTURE AND ‘PREDICTABILITY’ 
The analysis of argument structure presented in this paper requires often subtle and non-
generalisable semantic properties to be registered in lexical entries, partly in the form of 
discrete SEM-ARGS, together with explicit and non-derived representation of SYN-ARGS. 
Since these properties are stipulated for each lexical verb, syntactic information is 
repeated for each member of a syntactic argument class. One obvious consequence is 
that lexical entries no longer directly embody any ‘principles’ of correspondence 
between semantic and syntactic argument types, contra the SDH. It can therefore be 
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objected that intuitively necessary generalisations cannot be stated and that syntactic 
argument structure patterns are no longer ‘predictable’ but completely arbitrary. 
 However, the necessity for argument structure representations to be ‘predictable’ 
should be treated with some scepticism. Typically, the notion ‘predictable’ is conflated 
with the notion ‘algorithmic’, which is a necessary assumption of the SDH. But 
predictability is not algorithmic. Predictability is needed in order to inductively 
construct hypotheses about argument structure, so is certainly relevant to the child’s 
acquisition of the grammar, but predictions can be disconfirmed by data. It is not 
relevant to the adult’s knowledge. For example, the argument structure of neologisms 
(text us your entry/your entry to us) and creative uses (sneeze the napkin off the table) 
cannot be said to be a matter of ‘predictability’; rather, such phenomena say something 
about the nature of a grammar ALREADY ACQUIRED.41 
 On the other hand, in a descriptively adequate theory, generalisations about argument 
structure can be stated elsewhere: in terms of the mental organisation of lexical items, 
the conceptual ‘motivation’ of argument structure, and the organisation of concepts 
more generally (all of which can be used to make generalisations about argument 
structure patterns across languages). There is no corollary that such generalisations need 
to be built into the representations of the grammar itself. This is akin to claiming that 
donate has a Latinate ‘etymology feature’, as an explanation of why it does not 
syntactically alternate like Germanic give (an explanation for how its argument structure 
‘came to be’, to be sure, but not relevant to the speaker’s knowledge of that verb). 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has argued that neither the ‘strong’ nor ‘weak’ versions of the SDH 
successfully account for the ditransitive alternation, the former because the semantic 
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properties of the alternating verbs are too semantically heterogeneous to support it, the 
latter because the SDH entails that the grammar imposes semantic constraints on 
argument tokens – but metaphors and idioms clearly violate them. The alternative 
hypothesis, which requires syntactic argument structure to be explicitly represented in 
lexical entries, is able to account for non-prototypical use because it maintains discrete 
representations of semantic and syntactic argument types, and (correctly) attributes the 
licensing of argument tokens solely to the properties of the latter.  
 In sum, the analysis (re)confirms the necessity in any syntactic theory of formally 
representing syntactic argument properties in lexical entries. It also confirms the 
relevance of lexical semantics to argument structure, though not in the sense of the 
SDH. Apparent ‘selectional restrictions’ on PP complements of send and put can 
actually be accounted for semantically, preserving the strictly autonomous, syntactic 
nature of argument licensing. Further research into the subtleties of verbal semantics 
will clearly be crucial to an elucidation of links between meaning and argument 
structure and the still quite poorly-understood (yet undoubtedly real) principles of idiom 
formation. But seeking support for the SDH in that domain will probably remain a 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 The main ideas in this paper were presented at the International Symposium on Verbs, 
Clauses and Constructions at the Universidad de La Rioja on 27th October 2016. I thank 
the organisers and the participants for helpful comments. Three anonymous Journal of 
Linguistics reviewers have improved this paper by providing many sound comments 
and suggestions. All remaining errors are mine. 
2 The SDH is similar to the ‘Semantic Base Hypothesis’ (Koenig & Davis 2006), which 
the authors seek to defend, and a manifestation of what Newmeyer (2001) calls the 
‘Deep Alignment Hypothesis’, which he argues is mistaken. Levin & Rappaport Hovav 
(2005: Chapters 2 & 3) assess the limitations of role-based approaches and the attempts 
in the literature to overcome them. 
3 (2a) illustrates what for convenience I refer to throughout as a ‘double object’ 
structure, (2b) the ‘oblique’. The subscripts track the exchange of argument positions 
between the variants. Again for ease of reference only, the initial NP is called the 
‘subject’, NPi the ‘indirect object’, and NPj the ‘direct object’. 
4 In transformational generative grammar (TGG), interest in the ditransitive has borne 
mainly on questions concerning its proper syntactic ‘projection’, i.e. on how its (initial) 
syntactic structure is represented (see the survey in Emonds & Whitney 2006). The 
significance of the SDH for TGG can be understood as lying partly in its potential 
‘explanatory’ power (see Pesetsky 1995), partly in its fit with the general trajectory of 
the framework towards minimising (perhaps exorcising entirely) the role of the lexicon 
in grammatical computation (see Culicover & Jackendoff 2005 for discussion). 
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 The SDH is, of course, not universally assumed. ‘Declarative’ frameworks such as 
Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) and its offshoot Sign-Based 
Construction Grammar (SBCG) (Sag 2012) formally represent syntactic argument 
properties in lexical entries. It is no accident that the SDH’s ‘derivational’ nature is so 
closely related to the development of TGG. 
5  The symbol # is used throughout to indicate ‘semantically anomalous’, as opposed to 
‘grammatically ill-formed’, for which the conventional * is used. 
6  TOKENS of arguments are instances of use, instantiating TYPES, which are abstract 
arguments in lexical entries, both semantic (e.g. ‘animate’) and syntactic (e.g. ‘NP’).  
7 A similar phenomenon was observed by Marantz (1984): the role assigned to the 
subject can be a function of the verb and its (idiomatic) object (cf. John threw a 
ball/John threw a fit). 
8 As Levin & Rappaport Hovav (2005: 3) phrase it, ‘many current theories of grammar 
assume that the syntactic realization of arguments is predictable to a large extent from 
the meaning of their verbs’. Much hinges on what is understood by the word 
‘predictable’ here, but the salient characteristic of the SDH for this paper is the absence 
of a SYNTACTIC argument structure representation from the lexical entry of a given verb 
and its substitution by SEMANTIC principles of some kind, which (regardless of the 
details) will entail the problems analysed in this and the following section. Herzig 
Sheinfux et al. (2017) do not adhere to the SDH, since they preserve both syntactic and 
semantic argument representations, although it is a moot point whether the ‘expressive’ 
generalisations about semantic argument types they seek to capture need to be stated in 
lexical entries themselves. A theory of ‘argument realisation’, grounded in general 
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semantic or cognitive principles, which constrains the notion ‘possible argument 
structure’ in Universal Grammar, does not conflict with a rejection of the SDH either: 
see Section 6 for some discussion.  
9 McCawley (1968) demonstrated that putative semantic restrictions cannot apply solely 
to heads, since modifiers can affect the properties of an entire phrase: 
(i) (a) My (#buxom) neighbour is the father of two. 
  (b) The arm (#of the statue) is bleeding. 
McCawley (1971) argued more fully that apparent ‘selectional restrictions’ are 
predictable from knowledge of verb meaning, and do not need to be encoded in the 
grammar – a view endorsed by the present proposal. 
10 Chomsky (1986) relabelled subcategorisation ‘c-selection’ and hypothesised that 
‘s(emantic)-selection’ may render it redundant. Stowell had not proposed that 
subcategorisation frames be eliminated, merely that theta roles ‘license’ them, based on 
the claim that a lexical verb can take a complement only if it assigns that complement a 
role.  This claim is challenged, though, by idiomatic constructions which have 
semantically empty pronouns they nonetheless must subcategorise for: Do you take *(it) 
that I’m wrong? *Whati do you take ti (that I’m wrong)? In addition, ‘raising to object’ 
constructions have subcategorised (and case-marked) positions that do not have to 
receive a role at all: I believe *(him) to have died/I believe *(there) to be a good reason.  
11 Whereas in GB, the mapping was constrained by the UTAH, in the lexicalist 
alternatives, according to Levin & Rappaport Hovav (2005), it is performed by 
‘algorithms’. But although they cite a handful of (question-begging) informal rules or 
principles in the relevant part of their book (Chapter 5), there is nothing that formally 
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resembles an algorithm. In the literature, elaborated, precise and testable formulations of 
mapping rules are hard to find. 
12 An important caveat is that Jackendoff assumes the theory must still treat selectional 
restrictions as item-particular constraints on semantic well-formedness; his Section 6 
addresses the question of how this can be done given his assumptions. However, these 
constraints do not derive the subcategorisation features, which are independently 
stipulated (cf. Jackendoff 1990). 
13 The constraints must also cut both ways. For example, if a verb’s Agent theta role 
derives its NP subject, it cannot be the case that its NP subjects are not Agents: 
(i) John put some chilli in the sauce (to improve the flavour/please Mary). 
(ii) The chilli put some heat in the sauce (#to improve the flavour/please Mary). 
Clearly the NP subject of (ii) does not have the agentive properties (animacy, 
volitionality) that (i) has. 
14 Goldberg (1995) may be understood as a ‘constructional’ application of the SDH. The 
event schemata are already encoded in her (autonomous, phonologically empty) 
‘constructions’, so the ‘mapping problem’ becomes a question of what ‘fuses’ a verb 
with the right construction(s). But because of the divergence between the putative 
‘central sense’ of the ditransitive (double object) construction and the semantics of 
many of the verbs that appear in it, Goldberg posits a family of polysemous 
constructions remarkably similar to Pinker’s lexical subclasses – see Goldberg (1995: 
38) – despite inveighing against the ‘implausibility’ of postulating ‘multiple verb 
meanings’ (the ‘strong’ lexicalist position), and despite the absence of any overt 
reflexes of ‘constructional polysemy’. Her Chapter 6 acknowledges that metaphorical 
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expressions (obscurely referred to as a ‘delimitable class’) violate her constructional 
constraints, but proposes that these are ‘extensions’ licensed by various metaphors. It is 
unclear what, if anything, distinguishes these ‘extensions’ of use from different 
‘constructions’. 
15 Hence Rappaport Hovav & Levin’s (2008: 140) suggestion that the sense of promise 
can be ‘captured’ with will + have is misleading: ‘all will have a good time’ is not 
entailed by promise a good time to all as they claim; it paraphrases the content of the 
promise, but not the meaning of the whole expression. Earlier in their paper, they appeal 
to Koenig & Davis (2001), who first acknowledge the failure of the ‘caused possession’ 
entailment, then propose that what they call a ‘sublexical modality’ for these verbs may 
effectively circumscribe the event schema in order to preserve its syntactic validity. 
Thus promise ‘entails a transfer of possession in models in which the set of 
circumstances is restricted to those in which people honor their promises’ (Koenig & 
Davis 2001: 85). This suggests a philosophy of meaning thoroughly at odds with a 
mentalistic view of semantics (including Rappaport Hovav & Levin’s), but since no 
evidence is offered in support of it, their hypothesis is unfalsifiable.   
16 Their paper is replete with confusing and contradictory claims about the indirect 
object, which is curious given that the nature of the constraint is crucial to their 
argument. Their Section 4 states that ‘with all verbs’ it is ‘semantically restricted’ to the 
expression of a ‘recipient’ (said to be ‘generally an animate entity capable of 
possession’), yet on page 156 they note that in their earlier examples (see 25c, e, f) the 
indirect objects are indeed inanimate. Their footnote 10 cites another example of an 
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inanimate indirect object (give the page a number); they comment that ‘certain 
instances of inalienable possession’ can license inanimates, though without elucidation. 
17 An anonymous JL referee comments that London may nonetheless have an 
‘institutional reading’ that Park Square in (22e) cannot. Names of places and 
organisations can be metonymically animate, but this is a property independent of 
syntactic context (The school called and gave Walt the sack; As an ex-employee of the 
library, John decided to donate all his books to them). It remains the case that Ken 
Livingstone gave who the Congestion Charge? is a markedly infelicitous echo response 
to (24a). 
18 It is somewhat suspicious that the ‘possessive’ relation as represented in (21) so 
directly reflects the syntactic structure of the dyadic verb have in English. Consider by 
contrast the way the relation is expressed in Russian and Turkish (thanks to Benet 
Vincent for supplying these examples): 
  (i)  U John-a      estʹ dom. 
     at John-GEN is   house 
  (ii)  John’un    bir  evi     var.  
     John-GEN  a  house there.is  
     ‘John has a house.’ 
Since the relation of the ‘possessor’ to the ‘possessum’ is expressed in a radically 
different way to English, it is not clear how the putative semantic structure would map 
to morphosyntactic structure in these languages.  
19 The seemingly random distinction they make points to the difficulties that idioms 
pose for the SDH. O’Grady’s (1998) treatment of idioms assumes the SDH but does not 
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address them: his use of a ‘thematic hierarchy’ is a (somewhat forced) attempt to 
account for the structure of idioms without regard to their special meanings. A JL 
referee points out that a conservative application of the SDH would treat them simply as 
lexicalised exceptions to the mapping rules, therefore ‘listed’. 
20 RH&L appear to assume the sort of deep ‘cognitive metaphor’ (operating at the 
hidden level of conceptual structure) which is invoked by Pinker (1989) at various 
junctures, and (in support of the same classification of ditransitive verbs) by Gropen et 
al. (1989: 207), who assert that ‘[v]erbs of communication […] fit into the hypothesis 
under the assumption that they are mentally represented as metaphoric extensions 
involving the notion of ideas being possessed and transferred.’ In truth, this assumption 
is a kind of deus ex machina, which can be summoned as required to save the SDH 
from falsification. 
21 In fact, Goldberg (1995: 89–95) makes just this proposal for the ditransitive oblique, 
claimed to be a ‘metaphorical extension’ of the ‘caused motion construction’. 
22 The OED entry goes on to say that the cognate verb in Old English had the more 
restricted sense ‘of freely and gratuitously conferring on a person the ownership of a 
thing, as an act of bounty’ (cf. the nominal gift). Of modern English, the OED observes 
that ‘both the wider and the narrower senses are still current’.  
23 ‘Prototypical’ usage does not necessarily align completely with the property of a 
semantic argument. To take another example, the object of kiss is prototypically human, 
but one can kiss all kinds of things (the cat, a crucifix, the tarmac) without the act of 
kissing becoming metaphorical.  Similarly, it is not clear that the subject and indirect 
object arguments of give are typed specifically as ‘human’, because although typically 
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they are realised by NPs with human reference, a sentence like The cat gave the kitten a 
piece of fish still describes a physical act of transference and not a metaphorical one 
such as The cat gave the kitten a lick or The noise gave the kitten a fright. 
24 Example from Sullivan (2013: 100). 
25 At least one violation of the syntactic constraints is give NP to understand ‘allow NP 
to infer’. But given the sheer number of give-idioms, their syntactic regularity remains 
overwhelming.  
26 Metaphorical usage seems relatively restricted even when the indirect object is 
animate (send someone confirmation/a sign/one’s best wishes), and there are markedly 
fewer idioms (send NP word is a candidate for the latter), all of which are metaphorical 
acts of communication. If the DIRECT object is realised by an animate (Gus sent the 
Mexicans his most trusted employee), it is metaphorically ‘received’ by the indirect 
object, given the assumptions concerning the semantic argument types above.   
27 The verb show also has a ‘motion’ sense, in which case it patterns with send in 
subcategorising for a lexically unspecified PP (show/send somebody {into the room/out 
of the building}). In this case it means ‘accompany along a path’, not ‘demonstrate’: 
John showed Mary out of the building (by walking her down the corridor/#by drawing 
her a map).  This ‘caused motion’ sense is appealed to by Larson (2017: 412) to suggest 
that show somebody the door is an idiomatic caused motion construction with an 
‘elided’ preposition. However, it is obscure why the idiom would have the double object 
form if it is based on a verb with a Path argument, something impossible with a caused 
motion verb otherwise: send/take Mary *(towards) the exit. The idiom must therefore be 
based on the ‘cause to see’ sense and the double object form. 
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28 Some other ‘caused motion’ idioms of send are send NP {to Coventry, into a tailspin, 
off NP’s rocker, out of NP’s mind}. The variety of possible prepositions supports (44) as 
the correct argument structure. 
29 As McCawley (1971: 219) noted, many ‘violations’ of semantic constraints ‘are quite 
normal in reports of dreams, reports of other people’s beliefs, and science-fiction 
stories’. 
30 Sullivan’s formulation of the salient grammatical properties rests on Goldberg (1995), 
which makes it difficult to identify ‘source domains’ distinct from ‘target domains’ with 
any clarity, one reason being the lack of any formal representation of syntactic structure 
in that theory (the ‘syntactic’ level of Goldberg’s ‘ditransitive construction’ only 
mentions grammatical functions, such as ‘OBJ1’; yet grammatical functions represent 
notional RELATIONS BETWEEN forms, not the forms themselves). Sullivan does not 
discuss the oblique of (2b), but since for Goldberg this is itself a ‘metaphorical 
extension’ of the ‘caused motion construction’, it is obscure how the oblique could also 
function as a source domain, as metaphorical usage (London Underground gave each 
station to a different architect) shows it must. 
31 Sullivan claims that, in metaphorical ditransitives, minimally the direct object must 
be the target (as in this example). Although this seems usually to be the case, it is not an 
absolute constraint. Compare American industrial production gave us ready-sliced 
bread; John gave us ready-sliced bread. The direct object token conforms to the 
properties of the argument type in both sentences, yet it is clearly American industrial 
production in the former which provides the target for the metaphor.  
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32 Everaert (2010) points out that semantic non-compositionality entails nothing about 
the proper theoretical description of an idiom: given an appropriate theory and notation, 
even kick the bucket can be given a compositional analysis. Compositionality has been 
related in the literature to the internal modifiability of idiom constituents, and to 
‘syntactic flexibility’ (ability to undergo passivisation, extraction etc.), which has 
motivated analyses where there is a representational difference between idioms of 
different subtypes (Jackendoff 1997, Horn 2003). Discussion lies beyond the scope of 
this paper, but syntactic inflexibility does not entail a special structural representation. 
Postal (2004: 233–285) details numerous cases of verbs in non-idiomatic use that fail to 
passivise, though not for any lack of the ‘right’ structural properties. For that reason, 
syntactic mutability as a diagnostic for idiomaticity is ignored here. 
33 The productivity of the expressions in (54a, b) could be accounted for if only one or 
two exemplars are actually listed. On that basis, further expressions could be generated 
freely.   
34 All judgements are mine. A Google search, as well as scattered judgements in the 
literature, unsurprisingly suggest variation in acceptability, although context/pragmatic 
factors may of course play a part. Larson does not really address syntactic productivity 
as a diagnostic, but remarks (2017: 413) that genuinely alternating ditransitive idioms 
are a problem for (TGG) analyses that reject a derivational relationship between the 
double object and oblique structures. If there are ‘no’ ditransitive idioms as he claims, 
then the empirical problem simply goes away.  
 Larson claims that the expressions in (56e, f) (others are give rein/rise/way to NP) are 
not synchronically ditransitive at all, but ‘compound verbs’ inserted directly under a V 
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node, on the basis that give is ‘virtually’ inseparable from the nominal element. But as 
implied by the hedge, it is not absolutely inseparable and the nominal can be modified 
(give unexpected birth to, excessive rein to, sudden rise to, timid voice to, partial way 
to), so these elements must still have syntactic representation as NPs. It is a safe 
conclusion that they are both syntactic forms AND idioms. 
35 An unanswered yet intriguing question remains as to why there are no ditransitive 
idioms with lexicalised indirect objects only. It is suggestive that the concept ‘human’ 
(not merely ‘animate’ as claimed in Nunberg et al. 1994) seems to provide a poor 
metaphorical source in general, and that indirect object types, belonging to the source 
domain, are animate. However, since inanimate NPs can be indirect objects, it is not 
clear why these could not themselves provide a source domain in idioms, as inanimate 
NPs usually do (kiss the dust, obey a call of nature). It is possible for the indirect object 
position to be filled by an NP that is itself idiomatic (I decided to give shanks’s pony 
[‘walking’] a try), but the whole expression is not an idiom. In the very few ditransitive 
idioms where both NPs are lexicalised – Nunberg et al. (1994) cite give the devil his due 
and give hostages to fortune – only the devil is an indirect object that is (arguably) a 
source (even so, it can be substituted by the neutral a person).   
36 The phrasal listing of idioms is argued for by Di Sciullo & Williams (1987) and van 
Gestel (1995), but ‘phrasal insertion’ is clearly disfavoured in ‘Minimalist’ (post-
Chomsky 1995) work. Larson (2017: 402) admits the theoretical possibility; even so, it 
seems that lexically ‘discontinuous’ idiomatic phrases would be ruled out in principle. 
37 As an LAC is a form of ‘lexeme’, it embodies only one source of constraints on the 
realisation of verbs in surface structure, where (for example) the subject argument may 
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be unrealised, as in ing-VPs (Giving the formula to Gus was unwise) and passive VPs 
(Gus wanted the formula given to him). From (57) it can be seen that the LAC already 
encodes the ‘default’ VO syntactic order for English. Müller & Wechsler (2014: 5), as 
part of their critique of CxG, state that ‘phrasal’ representations in the lexicon ‘would 
allow’ for only one surface exponence, e.g. an active clause. However, the notation they 
adopt from HPSG makes the same assumption that ‘the underlying argument structure 
of the stem is basically specified as that of an active verb’ (their footnote 3). The 
differences between their ‘predicate argument structure’ and an LAC are therefore 
mostly notational, although the advantages of the LAC are: (i) a more rigorous 
separation of components; (ii) a uniform type of representation that can handle idioms 
(and other lexicalised phrases) as well. Otherwise, their ‘lexical rule’ approach to 
morphological derivation (passive verbs, deverbal adjectives, etc.) seems compatible 
with the theory of lexical entries set out here. 
38 The labels should be understood as representing verb-contingent arguments of the 
required type, and not to imply that they instantiate some generalisation.  
39 Unlike the theta-criterion of GB, nothing forces a SYN-ARG to be linked to a SEM-ARG 
(deriving the semantically null subjects of e.g. ‘weather’ verbs in English). 
40 The reader is invited to compare the representation with that of take to task in 
Jackendoff (2002: 169–170). 
41 The sneeze expression, among others, is cited in Goldberg (1995) as prima facie 
evidence for the existence of autonomous constructions. However, as pointed out by 
Croft (2003) and Boas (2008), her account implies that such expressions should be fully 
productive, which they are not. 
